Prior to our entry to the (then) EEC, British fishing was a model of sustainability. Thirty years on, after decades of the CFP, one of the most fertile and productive fishing grounds in the world (the North Sea) is being threatened with closure. Even in the relatively short-term, the CFP has been a disaster for British fishing. In 1995, 9,200 fishing vessels landed 912,000 tons of fish. In 2002, there were only 7,003 vessels, which landed 686,000 tons -- a 25 per cent reduction in catches over eight years. (1)

There are no technical reasons why catches should be falling. The nearest equivalent fishery has enjoyed consistently increasing catches, including in cod catches up 38 percent, and increased fish stocks. The decline -- and impending collapse of British fisheries -- is attributable solely to the Common Fisheries Policy.

There is now increasing evidence that the core regime applied by the CFP is itself flawed, in terms of its appreciation of fish biology, the quality and treatment of data, and the treatment of fishermen. So fundamental are these flaws that they are beyond reform. Therefore, the only hope of restoring British fishing grounds to commercial viability in the interests of all fishermen lies in returning control to the UK governments, and introducing entirely new management regimes.

In this paper, the reasons why the CFP is fundamentally flawed are explored, and options for a more rational policy are set out.

The fallacy of a "one-size-fits-all" regime

It is self evident that there is considerable variety in the nature of fishing grounds throughout the world, both physically and in terms of the species which inhabit them. Furthermore, even between grounds predominantly inhabited by the same species of fish, considerably differences in character may arise, not least because of differences in food sources and the adaptive behaviour of fish in utilising available food supplies. (2)

As to the fishermen who exploit fish stocks, it is equally self-evident that there are major differences in the scale and type of equipment they use, the fishing techniques employed, and the value placed on different species. Furthermore, in terms of exploitation of fishing stocks, where extraction capacity exceeds the supply of fish, limitations on fishing effort have to be devised and enforced in order to maintain commercially viable yields, it is also self-evident that there will be culturally determined differences in the responses to enforcement activity.

It is probably fair to say, therefore, that there can be no single fisheries management system which is appropriate for all conditions and all grounds, and be applicable to all fishermen.

Yet, as regards the management of the Common Fisheries Policy, as it applies to the waters of EU member states, with the exception of Mediterranean waters -- a common management regime applies. Such a 'one-size-fits-all' policy has to be fundamentally flawed, simply by virtue of it being a common policy. Different policies are required for different grounds, this making the very idea of a CFP invalid.

The technical flaws

The essence of the CFP control regime is the reliance on managing fishing effort through setting maximum limits on the tonnage of each of the main commercial species which may be caught in a calendar year (the Total Allowable Catch, or TAC). TACs are then shared out between member states, by awarding national quotas, which are in turn apportioned to individual fishing boats.

Inescapably, the foundation stone of this regime is the accurate determination of the TACs. In theory, this rests on assessing the fish stocks, natural predation and mortality and then predicting, by means of complex formulae, the amount of fishing which is permissible in order to maintain a healthy, sustainable population.

Basically population estimates rely on two main types of data, namely 'fishery-dependent' and 'fishery-independent' data. The former come from commercial vessels and comprise the quantities of fish landed into port (landings) and measures of the time spent fishing or searching for fish to catch. Landings data may also be complemented by estimates of the numbers of fish caught and discarded during fishing operations. Estimates of landings and discards therefore comprise estimates of the total catch made by fishing vessels. Fishery independent data come primarily from surveys carried out by government survey vessels. (3)

As regards fishery dependent data, these are inherently flawed. Quota allocations in many instances do not allow fishermen to catch sufficient fish to make a living. Therefore, and inevitably, they cheat, either by not declaring landings or by making false declarations as to the locations in which the fish were caught. And the lower the quotas, the greater pressure there is to cheat. Yet, if data on landings is unreliable, this is exacerbated by the facet central to the CFP system of quotas, which requires fishermen to discard non-quota species they catch, and any amounts of fish they catch which bring them over quota. According to the FRS, "the amount of fish discarded each year is 'noisy' -- that is, the estimate is not very accurate". In fact, the figures are a wild guess yet, in some fisheries at some times of the year, discards exceed the actual number of fish landed.

Even the EU Commission now acknowledges that "...the reliability of commercial fisheries information has declined...", (4) while the Norwegian authorities, who have a better reputation for fisheries management, note that misreporting and unreliability of catch statistics, and the inadequate accounting of discards and by-catches are "causing problems in the formulation of TACs". (5)

Because of the unreliability of fisheries dependent data, the Commission is turning increasingly to data from research vessels, but these too are flawed. For instance, in the critical North Sea cod fishery, test trawls are made by DEFRA commissioned survey vessels, as part of the International Bottom Trawl Survey (IBTS) series. These are conducted in the spring and autumn, when standardised gear is shot in specific locations, at the same time each year, and trawling is carried out at a standard speed for one half hour. The catch is then measured, and compared year-on-year to determine changes in stocks.

The process has been compared with flying in a hot-air balloon, high over a land completely hidden by a thick layer of cloud, with the occupants seeking to determine what lives on the land, how many of each species there are, how they reproduce, and how the populations might change in the future -- all with a basket and a long rope. The surveyors are asked to scrape the basket along the ground for half-an-hour or so, haul it up, and have a look at the contents, from which they are asked to "guesstimate" the population, a process which they then repeat at the same time the following year.

In fact, the problems are even greater than this analogy would indicate. Technically, the result is known as the "catch per unit effort" (CPUE), but it is well known that CPUE can vary over time and can be skewed by uncontrollable variables, giving different yields even when fish stocks are constant. It may even indicate a decline in fish stocks that are actually increasing, or an increase where they are declining. Some US authorities, therefore, do not consider this to be the most appropriate index, (6) but it is nevertheless being increasingly relied upon by the Commission, on which to base important policy decisions.

Not least of the problems is the choice of gear. In the interests of standardisation, the trawl net used is that designed specifically by the French Research Institute for Exploitation of the Sea (IFREMER) for carrying out fish surveys. It is called a Grande Overture Verticale trawl (GOV trawl), which replaced the Scottish-designed "Granton" trawl previously used.

Described by fishermen as a 'semi-pelagic' trawl, this gear does not make firm bottom contact. However, North Sea cod are bottom feeders and are known to adopt the escape strategy of diving for the bottom, under such nets. Therefore, they are not readily caught by this type of gear, and test trawls using it will consistently underestimate the number of cod in this fishery. (7) Elsewhere, with different food sources, cod may become mid-water feeders and the gear will be more suitable. Gear designers and fabricators readily attest that there can be no such thing as a standard gear, and that modifications in gear -- and the techniques in using it -- must be adopted in different fisheries, even to catch the same species. Yet the scientists insist on using standardised gear.

If this was not bad enough, since the survey technique demands that the same area is trawled each year, it can in no way represents either the actual practice of commercial fishing, or the nature of fish distribution. Extending the 'balloon' analogy, it is as if the surveyors are trawling a fixed area of a vast prairie in an attempt to estimate the population of a roaming herd of bison. Fishermen readily report that fish constantly move around -- to the extent that one area which has produced fish will not necessarily produce fish again. The whole nature of commercial fishing is that the fishermen still have to hunt for the fish and even trawlers working side-by-side have been known to produce very different catch levels.

Even then, it gets worse. The survey areas were determined many decades ago and are still used, but since they were established, oil production in the North Sea has become a major industry. Many fishermen point out that the industry has transformed the fishery, not least because of the 6,000 k of undersea oil pipelines which criss-cross the area. Their warmth promotes a highly localised increase in food supply, to which the fish gravitate, often deserting less fertile areas. Fishermen have thus taken to trawling along pipeline routes, but the very existence of the pipelines is ignored by the surveyors, who trawl away from these areas.

Other variables include the weather, with higher catches being reported in the turbid water after a storm, and wind direction in certain fisheries will have a considerable impact on the ease with which fish are caught. Yet another variable is towing speed. Paired trawlers, able to maintain higher towing speeds, catch considerably higher proportions of larger, faster swimming fish than some of the slower, single trawlers. None of these factors are taken into account by DEFRA surveyors.

The situation thus exists where neither the fisheries dependent data nor the fisheries independent data can give accurate information as to the fish stocks. Nor indeed can the combination of data help. One inadequate measure applied to a general model of fish stocks can result in poor performance of the whole model. (8) In other words, not only has the Commission no reliable data on which to base determinations of TACs, such data can wildly underestimate fish stocks in the fisheries monitored, or just as equally overstate the numbers of fish available for exploitation.

The parameters for effective control measures

In the final analysis, within the context of the CFP, the science of fish stock assessment provides only a backcloth to the determination of TACs. It is well recognised that quota allocation is determined by political bargaining and it is not unknown for the sum of national quotas to exceed the TACs allocated, with TACs thus being revised upwards to allow the quotas to stand. (9)

On the basis that the Commission has no clear idea what fish stocks are available in any one fishery, nor of the actual tonnage of fish caught -- or even landed -- from any particular fishery -- the actual control mechanisms applied are actually retrospective. What happens, in essence, is that monitoring of landings is carried out and, when these indicate a decline in fishing stocks, the response is invariably focused on 'overfishing', leading to demands for reductions in fishing effort. This invariably involves reductions in quotas and capacity, the latter involving the scrapping of fishing boats. The final weapon in the armoury is the closure of fishing grounds.

Assessing the essence of effective control models, in order to determine the parameters for a general model, one can turn to successful fisheries such as New Zealand, the Falklands and, in particular, the Faroes, which has the only expanding fishery in the North Atlantic. In each case, there is a clear recognition that a limited resource, and an excess of capacity dedicated to its exploitation, needs an effective management system.

In two of the fisheries (Falklands and Faroes), the predictive model, using species-specific TACs as a mechanism of control, is avoided. In outline, instead of 'output control' -- the restriction on the quantities of fish landed, decided by the TAC -- these authorities rely primarily on 'input control', limiting the fishing effort but not imposing restrictions on the fish landed. Discards are prohibited and fishermen are required to land all that they catch. In New Zealand, the TAC system is used but quotas are set by regional fisheries management organisations, in which fishermen participate. Quotas are transferable between classes of fishermen and thus become a tradeable asset.

However, a facet which is common to all three fisheries, and others such as the Norwegian and Icelandic fisheries, is 'ownership'. Each territory goes out of its way to stress that the fish within their areas of control are their property, and retain absolute control over their exploitation. They are, therefore, free to determine their own type of management, appropriate to their fisheries, and each have adopted different systems, facets of each being unique. And all three fisheries are able to control fishing effort, by licensing vessels and restricting the number permitted to fish.

Of these successful fisheries, that most comparable with the situation in the UK is the Faroes operation. This, in journalistic terms, has been described as 'booming'. (10) But what was most remarkable about a report from a specialist journalist who spent a week in Faroe examining the fishery was that, amongst the politicians, processors, suppliers, vessel operators and fishermen, he could not find a single voice opposed to the way the fisheries were managed:

There are always some complaints, but the grass roots hatred and sheer loathing of the management system that is heard from fishermen in Iceland and most EU countries is entirely absent in the Faroes. Unbelievably, everyone in the Faroes appears happy with their system. Stocks are healthy and fishing is flourishing.

This has not always been the case. Until 1996, the fishery was run on what would be considered 'conventional' lines, following recommendations from the international scientific body which advises on fisheries management, the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). After a series of declining catches, however, on 1 June 1996, the Faroes introduced a new regime based on allocating fishing days to different types of boats, each of which were allowed to operate only in specified zones. There were no catch limits, and no discards.

Since then, the Faroese have ignored ICES advice to cut back on fishing effort, and even close some of their grounds. By 2002, such was the concern of ICES that it was recommending a cut in fishing effort of 35 per cent for haddock and fifty per cent for cod. This advice was ignored, with the result that the haddock catch increased from 14,000 to 22,000 tons, and the cod catch from 26,000 to 36,000 tons, while stock assessments showed that not only were catches increasing, but stocks as well. (11) By contrast, Iceland, which is considered a 'model' fishery, having closely followed ICES advice, has seen catches decline from a peak of 550,000 tons in 1954 to 260,000 tons in 2000, with the current TAC set at 190,000 tons.

The explanation for this is not difficult to understand. Basically, commercial fishing is not a 'zero-sum' equation: an effectively managed fishery will produce more fish of commercial weight than grounds which are not fished. The reason is that fish populations behave in the same way as any other population group and the crucial determinant of population size is the food supply. As a general principle, the greater the food supply in a given area, the larger the population that can be maintained but, given that the supply is finite, other limits apply. If there is a flush of juvenile fish, competition for food, and increased predation, stresses the population and natural mortality increases, with the survivors often exhibiting stunted growth. Increasing the harvest by hard fishing, under these conditions, keeps the stock size moderate and actually increases the number of good quality adult fish.

In this context, much has been written and talked about fisheries closures, especially in the context of the now infamous Newfoundland and Barents Sea fisheries, after dramatic collapses of stocks. The proximate cause in each of these cases has been attributed to overfishing, although catastrophic mis-match between food supply and fish stocks, leading to starvation of the population, may have been the real cause. However, an equally plausible explanation is that a cyclical increase in juveniles gave rise to stocks suffering from lack of food. In both cases, however, the response was to reduce fishing effort, in each case this stratagem preceding a collapse in stocks.

A better answer, in some circumstances, seems to be to address the reasons for the deficiencies in food supply -- for which industrial fishing may be responsible in the North Sea -- and, counter-intuitively, to increase fishing effort and thus thin out the stock, bringing it into balance with the available food supply. (12) This is precisely the strategy adopted by the Faroes, which has also placed limitations on industrial fishing.

What is also particularly important about the Faroes model, however, is that the fishermen accept the system, and trust it. They willingly supply catch data, which is therefore accurate, and there are no discards to skew stock assessments. Faroese scientists, therefore, are confident that they have good data on which to fine tune the system, (13) which can include closing of certain grounds for limited periods, if fishing pressure starts to damage stocks.

New policy or the CFP?

Reviewing the parameters for an effective fisheries management system, it seems clear that it must embody the following characteristics:

• It must be designed for the specific fishery and be sufficiently flexible to account for the cultural and economic needs of the fishermen involved, and the characteristics of the fish stocks to be exploited.
• The fishery management must have absolute control of the fishing capacity, and be able to restrict the number and type of vessels permitted to fish.
• Overall fishing capacity should be controlled with regard to the levels of exploitable fish stocks.
• There should be a reasonably accurate assessment of fish stocks, which can only be determined with the active support of fishermen, who will only supply accurate data if they trust the management system.
• TAC systems are unworkable -- fishing effort should be limited by use of 'input controls' such as 'days at sea', applied on an equitable basis to give all fishermen fair access to exploitable stocks.
• Fishing effort should be attuned to accord with population dynamics of fish stocks.

Assessing the current policy applying to UK waters, ie. the CFP, it is clear that the nature of the CFP, embodying the treaty requirement for 'equal access', cannot and does not afford fisheries management the facility to control fishing capacity, and nor is fishing capacity attuned to the level of fish stocks available. Nor, as a 'common' policy, can it allow for the flexibility required of an effective policy.

Then, inherent in the system adopted under the CFP -- the TAC/quota system -- is a situation which mitigates against the collection of accurate fish stock data. This is not a problem that can be solved, as it is an inherent failing of the system.

As to 'days at sea' limitations, these have been proposed by British governments, but the systems proposed have always been in addition to quota system, and were not to be applied to fishing fleets from other member states, thus disadvantaging British fishermen. Within the current CFP framework, 'days at sea' provisions cannot be equitable. Finally, as to the biological principles applied to the CFP, it is the case that, despite its obvious and transparent failures, the EU is committed to following ICES advice. Within that framework, it would not be possible to attune fishing effort to population dynamics in a realistic way.

On this basis, it is not difficult to draw the conclusion that the CFP is flawed and that, if an effective fisheries management regime is to be applied to UK waters, one of two things must happen: either the CFP must be reformed, or Britain must withdraw from the CFP and introduce its own policy, independently of the CFP, along wholly different lines.

It is a matter of political judgment as to whether seeking reform would be a realistic proposition, or whether -- if it were possible -- it could be achieved within a timescale that would be acceptable. Recent history, however, does not suggest that reform of something as acutely political as the CFP could be achieved, in which case the only realistic alternative is withdrawal from the CFP.
 

Footnotes
	1	MAFF/DEFRA statistics.
	2	For instance, in the North Sea, a substantial proportional of the cod summer diet is sand eel, a food source not available to Atlantic cod. See: Love, R M (Undated), Torry Advisory Note No. 71. Processing Cod: The Influence of Season and Fishing Ground, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Torry Research Station.
	3	Details from FRS Marine Laboratory, Aberdeen
	4	See Project No. 94/038 http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/doc_et_publ/liste_publi/studies/ biological/1309R03B94038.pdf
	5	http://odin.dep.no/md/nsc/Intermediate_meeting/023021-990007/index-hov005-b-n-a.html
	6	Anon (1988), Improving Fish Stock Assessments, Commission on Geosciences, Environment and Resources (CGER), Ocean Studies Board, p. 211.
	7	Personal communication: Fred Normandale, an experienced North Sea skipper who spent time on DEFRA/MAFF survey vessels.
	8	Anon (1988), op cit.
	9	Nor is it unknown for the science to be driven by political considerations. After a PESCA-funded initiative, Scientists and Fishermen: Working Together, aimed at improving co-operation and the flow of information, government scientists went on to develop a multi-species fisheries management model, without consulting the fishermen, who felt 'insulted' and 'betrayed'. The researchers later admitted that the scientific basis for their model had been so sketchy that they had been tempted to abandon it, but they had been mandated to come up with answers by the (European) Commission. (Fishing News, 28 November 2003)
	10	Fishing News International, June 2003, 'Faroe fisheries booming'.
	11	Kristjansson, Jon. Fishing News, 11 April 2003.
	12	See: Fishing News International, June 2003, 'North Sea stocks need thinning, not saving, claims Icelander'.
	13	Personal Communication: John Rajani, Counsellor, Representative of the Faroe Islands

Richard North .4 December 2003