'Europe' and the Constitutional Referendum
by Richard North

Despite continued refusal to consider a referendum on the European Union's constitutional treaty, Blair may still back down. However, there is no guarantee that a 'no' campaign would succeed. In fact, by astute political manoeuvring, Blair - or his successor - could win a referendum with relative ease, locking Britain into the new European construct for the foreseeable future. In this 'monologue', this and other scenarios are explored.

On the current timetable, the IGC process is expected to be complete by the end of April 2004. The constitutional treaty which emerges from it is due to be signed in Rome in June 2004. Under the current provisions, it would have to be ratified by June 2006.

Before the treaty can be ratified, an Act amending the European Communities Act must be passed. Arguably, given current sensitivities, a Bill to that effect might not be presented to Parliament until the November 2004 Queen's speech. It can expect a rough passage in the Commons and could be delayed by the Lords, who are expected to attach an amendment requiring a referendum before the Act takes effect.

Given that the constitutional treaty was not mentioned in the Labour Party manifesto of 2001, the government could not invoke the Parliament Act into order to force the Bill through the Lords. Therefore, there is a distinct chance that the Bill could be further delayed. The treaty might not be ratified by the time the prime minister is ready to announce a general election, which must be held by June 2006. Thus, the issue could get caught up in the election campaign.

This would be disastrous for the Labour Party, which prefers to fight general elections on domestic issues, and would favour the Conservatives who score better on EU affairs. For this reason, in the last two general election campaigns, Blair took great care to neutralise EU issues. It is almost certain that he or his successor would do this again. The strategy has been to defer debate to promised referendum campaigns - on Britain's entry to the euro. For the next election, it would be logical to expect a similar scenario, with Blair promising a referendum on the constitutional treaty after the election.

There is, of course, the other possibility that Blair could hold a referendum before the election, but the effect of a 'no' victory would be politically damaging and open the question as to 'what now?'. The effect would be to keep 'Europe' on the political agenda. Alternatively, he could rush through the ratification without a referendum and let the general election take its course. But that would put him in the position of having ignored the wishes of the people, again giving the Conservatives an advantage. This is not something any intelligent strategist would do willingly and the odds are probably against it. The most likely course of action is for Blair to concede the referendum, holding it after the general election.

Should Blair adopt this strategy, timing will be crucial. Clearly, he must allow a period of time for campaigning, and then, if not already complete, passage of the ECA amendment Bill. A referendum might take up to a year which would mean that, in order to achieve ratification by the deadline of June 2006, an election before a referendum would have to be held spring 2005, at the latest.

However, with the possibility of a deteriorating economic position and other major crises on the horizon - not least a breakdown in the electricity supply system - the indications are that the longer Blair leaves an election the less chance he has of winning. Therefore, for purely domestic political reasons, Blair might welcome the opportunity of going to the country early. He might even use the excuse of a referendum so a date in the autumn of 2004 - announced after the treaty signing - might be a possibility.

On present indications, the next election will yield a historically low turnout. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the Conservatives will have recovered their support and, the earlier the election, the less chance they will have to recover. If the Liberal Democrats succeed in targeting weak and marginal Conservatives seats, a possible but very likely outcome of might be a further Conservative losses, with the Lib-Dems pushing for second place and Labour retaining its overall majority.

There is, of course the possibility that the Conservatives could win, but the worst case scenario is that they will be faced with a referendum after a general election defeat. Assuming that they would then seek to lead the 'no' campaign, they (and the campaign) would be in some difficulty. In the first instance, the defeat would almost certainly trigger the resignation of Iain Duncan-Smith and precipitate a leadership contest. The Conservatives could find themselves engaged in a major campaign, with depleted funds, demoralised activists, uncertain leadership and elements of factional in-fighting.

Blair would then be left in an ideal position to win his referendum, capitalising on the 'honeymoon effect', albeit minimal. He would also be able to rely on the support of an invigorated Liberal Democrat party, as well as the services of Conservative Europhiles.

Recent events have shown that Blair has by no means given up his policy of 'positive engagement' in Europe. Furthermore, his ambition to take a central role in European affairs is hardly likely to diminish. But it has been made clear to him by numerous leading EU politicians that this will only happen if Britain joins the euro. On that basis, Blair will almost certainly be tempted to consider the possibility of a 'super-referendum' which will combine both approval of the constitutional treaty and British entry to the euro.

Whether or not the euro is included in the campaign, there are increasingly strong indications that Blair would focus his campaign on the 'in-out' question. He is likely to claim that failure to ratify the constitutional treaty would mean either that the UK would have to withdraw from the EU, or be forced to accept a 'second-class' status. He would assert that either would leave Britain weakened and 'isolated'. If he elected for a 'super-referendum', he would seek to rely on linkage between the euro and the constitution to drag the euro through.

Herein lies a further, and at present insurmountable difficulty for the Conservatives if they maintain their position of opposing the constitutional treaty while supporting continued membership. If Blair argues that voting 'no' will precipitate withdrawal, the Conservatives will have to argue why it will not. There is then a risk that the focus of the campaign will shift. Instead of a simple 'yes-no', argument, much time could be expended on the meaning of 'no'.

Against this background, the Conservatives will be seen as supporting the 'status quo'. But that 'status quo' is one of supporting membership of an organisation which its own members admit to being flawed, in the context of a constitutional treaty which is claimed to make it better. The Conservative stance, therefore, could end up being translated into supporting the existing, and blocking any 'improvements', eliciting negative reactions.

Blair could make the Conservative position look even more unattractive. If the outcome of the treaty ratification process is that some countries refuse to accept the constitution, the likelihood is that the other member states will form an inner core which will adopt a version of the constitution. Should Britain vote 'no' and thus not ratify the treaty, Blair could argue that she could find herself in the 'outer circle', bound by all existing and new laws, but not able to influence the making of new laws. In this scenario, a 'no' vote which kept Britain in the EU could be represented as the worst of all outcomes.

To add to what could then become a highly confused campaign, Conservative Europhiles and anti-EU campaigners, such as UKIP and the BNP, would almost certainly claim that non-ratification could lead to withdrawal, the latter actively campaigning for precisely that outcome. They might expect to agree. One would also expect the BBC would give plenty of publicity to that view.

Faced with the prospect of leaving the EU, and other warnings of the dire consequences, tempered only by an incoherent campaign that is unable to give a clear message as to and positive consequences of a 'no' vote, it would be unwise to believe that the public would necessarily deliver a decisive 'no'. The referendum, far from being a release from the grip of the EU, might cement us in for the foreseeable future and spell the death of Euroscepticism. Arguably, it would also be another nail in the coffin for the Conservative Party.

In the event of Britain voting 'no' in any referendum, there is no question of her being expelled from the European Union. Nor can the constitutional treaty come into effect unless all member states ratify it so, in the immediate post-referendum future, the situation would continue as before.

In, as expected, a number of states refuse or otherwise be unable to ratify the treaty, however, and those which have ratified adopt a version of the constitution and form an 'inner core', Britain would be excluded from this grouping. Under a Blair government, it is unlikely that the British response would be anything other than to accept what might become a 'second-class membership'. Thus, a 'no' vote under Blair could result in Britain's position being worse than it is now.

Arguably, the only way there could be a positive outcome from a 'no' vote is if we then had a government which was prepared to exploit the situation. Inevitably, only the Conservatives could fulfil this role, in which case it would need to work up a genuine and practical 'best case scenario' which could arise from a 'no' vote. That, presumably, would be on the lines of Britain creating a 'New Europe', leading a realignment of member states which refuse to ratify, developing a broad-based intergovernmental association.

In terms of a general election campaign, this would enable the Conservatives to argue that a 'no' vote in the hands of a Europhile Labour Party would have no meaningful outcome. Blair, or his successor, would simply seek to find a way of circumventing the wishes of the people. Only a Conservative government, it could be argued, would be in a position to give effect to the peoples' wishes, should they choose to vote 'no'. By that means, 'Europe' could remain a valid election issue.

Richard North . 27 September 2003